Learning in Speculative Bubbles: An Experiment by Hong, Jieying et al.
 18‐882	
	
	
	
“Learning	in	Speculative	Bubbles:	An	Experiment”	
	
	
	
Jieying	Hong,	Sophie	Moinas,	and	Sébastien	Pouget	
January	2018	
Learning in Speculative Bubbles: An Experiment∗
Jieying Hong†, Sophie Moinas‡, and Se´bastien Pouget §
January 17, 2018
Abstract
Does traders’ experience reduce their propensity to participate in speculate bub-
bles? This paper studies this issue from a theoretical and an experimental viewpoint.
We focus on a game in which bubbles, if they arise, are irrational, as in the Smith,
Suchanek, and Williams (1988)’s set up. Our theoretical results are based on Camerer
and Ho (1999)’s Experience-Weighted Attraction learning model. Adaptive traders are
assumed to adjust their behavior according to actions’ past performance. In the long
run, learning induces the market to converge to the unique no bubble equilibrium.
However, learning initially increases traders’ propensity to speculate. In the short run,
more experienced traders thus create more bubbles. An experiment shows that bub-
bles are very pervasive despite the fact that subjects have become experienced. Our
estimation of the EWA model also indicates that learning is at work.
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1 Introduction
Do traders learn to avoid participating in speculative bubbles? This question is the object of
a long-standing debate in the financial economics literature. On the one hand, Smith et al.
(1988) propose an experimental design to study speculative bubbles and show that bubbles
are less likely but do not disappear with experience. This result is confirmed by King, Smith,
Williams, and VanBoening (1993). Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005) further show
that bubbles also diminish with experience when only part of the traders are experienced. On
the other hand, more recent papers suggest that bubbles can be rekindled when experienced
traders are confronted with new market parameters (Hussam, Porter, and Smith (2008)) and
when new traders enter the market in an overlapping-generation experiment (Deck, Porter,
and Smith (2014)). The objective of this paper is to study learning in speculative bubbles
and to identify, both theoretically and experimentally, the conditions under which experience
can be expected to shut down speculation. To achieve this objective, we focus on the bubble
game designed by Moinas and Pouget (2013). In this game, trading proceeds sequentially,
traders’ position in the sequence is random, and prices increase exponentially. When there
is a price cap, there is no bubble at the dominance-solvable Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
confronted with the highest potential price, a rational trader refuses to buy. Anticipating
this behavior, a rational trader receiving the second highest price should also refuse to buy.
Proceeding backward, this logic rules out the formation of bubbles (the higher the price cap,
the higher the number of iterated reasoning steps needed to reach equilibrium). However,
when traders suffer from bounded rationality (in the form of limited depth of reasoning as
in cognitive hierarchy models or in the form of random mistakes as in the quantal response
models), bubbles can emerge
The bubble game is useful to study learning to speculate for three reasons. First, there is
a finite number of decisions individuals can make. This makes it possible to analyze behavior
in the bubble game thanks to learning models without making strong auxiliary assumptions.
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Second, the bubble game enables to study different types of speculative behavior: speculation
that is due to costly mistakes and speculation that arises when traders try to profitably trade
on others’ mistakes. Third, the bubble game is short enough so that it can be repeated a large
number of times. This enables to provide subjects with numerous learning opportunities.
We run an experiment based on the bubble game in a stranger design with a small or
with a large number of steps of reasoning required to understand that there is no bubble
equilibrium. In our experiment, 132 subjects participate in a bubble experiment similar
to Moinas and Pouget (2013) with two treatment variables: the cap on the first price is
either 1 or 10,000 (corresponding to a maximum number of steps of reasoning of 2 and 6,
respectively) and the number of replications of the experiment is either 10 or 20.
Our experimental findings are as follows. When the cap is 1, there are few steps of
reasoning and we find that the probability to participate in bubbles tends to decrease over
time. When the cap is 10,000, this probability tends to increase. Thus, in our experiment, we
observe bubbles that do not vanish with experience. We run panel logit regressions to study
individual speculative behavior. These regressions show that subjects’ behavior changes
depending on the outcomes of past actions. This is an evidence of adaptive learning. Our
experimental results, at the market and at the individual levels, suggest that individual
learning does not immediately convert into markets experiencing less bubbles.
From a theoretical standpoint, we capture traders’ learning process using Camerer and
Ho (1999)’s Experience-Weighted Attraction model. This adaptive learning model is general
in the sense that it nests belief-based learning and reinforcement learning. Traders’ choices
depend on the various actions’ attractions, i.e., accumulated past payoffs. A crucial param-
eter in this model is the imagination parameter. When it is equal to 0, agents only reinforce
chosen actions, as it is the case in reinforcement learning. When the imagination param-
eter is greater than 0, agents also reinforce actions that were not actually chosen, as it is
implicitly assumed in belief-based learning. Traders’ attractions are transformed into choice
probabilities via a logistic function with a given payoff responsiveness parameter. When this
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responsiveness parameter is 0, players choose each action with the same probability, while
when it is infinite, players choose with probability one the action with the highest attraction.
Camerer and Ho (1999)’s model is useful because it enables us to study whether adaptive
traders’ speculating behavior depends on the type of learning process.
We first provide analytical results. In the long term, the market converges to the unique
dominance-solvable no-bubble equilibrium. This is in line with the analysis of Milgrom
and Roberts (1991). However, in the short term, the propensity to speculate can increase.
In order to study speculation in the intermediate term, we run simulations of the bubble
game with 1,000 independent trials that each includes 1,000 successive runs. We show that
learning initially increases traders’ propensity to speculate. More experienced traders thus
initially create more bubbles. The effect of imagination on speculation depends on whether
traders can observe the choice of the next trader in the market sequence even if they do not
speculate.
To better understand the type of learning at work in our data, we structurally estimate
the learning model on our experimental data. We find an imagination parameter of 0.45, not
statistically different from zero. This indicates that imagination is not an important ingre-
dient for learning in our speculation setting. Our estimate of the responsiveness parameter
is 0.2. This suggests that there is a lot of noise in individual behavior. Vuong tests indicate
that the learning model fits the data better than a no-learning model in which agents’ choice
probabilities are constant and similar to the first period of play. Our structural estimations of
the learning model thus suggests that learning is indeed at work in our experiment. Overall,
our results show that learning does not easily shut down speculative bubbles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section offers a review of the
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the bubble game and the experimental setup. Section
4 presents the experimental results. Section 5 offers a theoretical analysis of bubbles based
on adaptive learning and estimates the EWA model. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Related literature
In their seminal contribution, Smith et al. (1988) propose an experimental setup in which
(irrational) bubbles can be studied, and they show that such bubbles arise in their ex-
periments.This contribution has triggered an extremely large number of experimental and
theoretical work on bubble formation (see for example, Deck et al. (2014) for a discussion
of a number of the follow-up studies to Smith et al. (1988), and Caginalp and Ermentrout
(1990) for a mathematical model of speculation inspired by Smith et al. (1988)).
Smith et al. (1988) also show that several replications with the same subjects were re-
quested to attenuate the emergence of bubbles. Their results were replicated in numerous
subsequent papers including King et al. (1993) who show that bubbles emerge in a variety
of market environments and also conclude that three replications of the experiments were
necessary to shut down irrational speculation. Dufwenberg et al. (2005) further shows that
bubbles diminish even when part of the traders are experienced.
The impact of experience on bubble formation is however not completely clear since
more recent papers suggest that bubbles can be rekindled when experienced traders are
confronted with new market parameters (Hussam et al. (2008)) and when new traders enter
the market in an overlapping-generation experiment (Deck et al. (2014)). Our paper speaks
to this debate and studies, both theoretically and experimentally, the conditions under which
experience can be expected to shut down irrational speculative bubbles.
Duffy and U¨nver (2006) use the Smith et al. (1988) bubble environment in order to study
the behavior of artificially-intelligent agents. They show that near-zero intelligence traders
generate irrational bubbles and crashes when traders are endowed with some foresight ability
and adopt a price setting behavior with anchoring effects and within exogenously defined
bounds. We complement the analysis of Duffy and U¨nver (2006) by studying how learning
affects speculative behavior.
Some papers have studied learning to speculate in an environment were it is rational. In
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this case, the surprising result is that speculation did not occur as much as could be expected.
Duffy and Ochs (1999) for example show that subjects had difficulties coordinating on the
speculative equilibrium in a money experiment. They show that this lack of speculation was
related to a tendency of subjects to rely on past choices’ payoffs rather than on the profit to
be expected from speculation. Duffy (2001) extends the analysis of Duffy and Ochs (1999)
and shows that the propensity to speculate increases when profit opportunities are more
frequent or less risky in line with an agent-based model that incorporates some features of
adaptive learning. We complement these articles by proposing a simple irrational bubble
experiment in which a more general adaptive learning model can be tested and estimated.
Learning has also been extensively studied both by experimentalists and by empiricists.
For example, Nagel and Tang (1998) propose an experiment to study learning in the normal-
form centipede game. Their results suggest that learning is not necessarily conducive to
equilibrium. Duffy and Nagel (1997) show that directional learning in a beauty contest game
can induce some agents to adjust their play away from equilibrium as they get experienced.
This phenomenon can also be present in the adaptive learning model that we study and we
show that it plays an important role in the fact that experience might induce more bubbles
in the short-run. The result that more experienced traders may speculate more echoes the
findings of De Martino, O’Doherty, Ray, Bossaerts, and Camerer (2013) indicating that
people who are more sophisticated, in the sense that they are better able to infer intentions
from others’ actions, are more prone to speculate in bubbles.
Empiricists have also found clever ways at identifying learning and its impact on various
financial and macroeconomic variables. For example, Kaustia and Knu¨pfer (2008) find that
the outcomes of IPOs in which they have participated affect future investment behavior of
individuals. Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2016) show that investors’ expectations regarding
stock returns and inflation depend on their own economic experience rather than on the
entire sample of information available. This indicates that learning based on experience is
at work in the field. We complement these studies by showing how adaptive learning can
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fuel speculative bubbles. In particular, our theoretical analysis based on adaptive learning
complements the analyses of Caginalp and Ermentrout (1990), Caginalp and DeSantis (2011),
and Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2015) which show that extrapolative behavior
can trigger bubble formation.
3 The bubble game and the experimental setup
3.1 The bubble game
To study how experience affects speculative behavior, we focus on the bubble game designed
by Moinas and Pouget (2013). This game features a sequential market for a valueless asset.
There are three traders. Each of them is randomly assigned to a position in the market
sequence: a trader can be first, second, or third in the sequence with probability 1
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. Traders
do not have information about their positions but can infer some information from the price
at which they are offered to buy the asset.
For simplicity, prices are assumed exogenous. The first trader is offered a price 10n,
where n is random and follows a geometric distribution of parameter 1
2
: P (n = k) = 1
2
k+1
,
where k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}. Each subsequent trader is (potentially) offered a price that is ten
times higher than the previous price. This setting is such that no trader can ever be sure to
be last in the market sequence despite prices revealing some information regarding traders’
position. In this case, Moinas and Pouget (2013) show that rational bubbles can arise at the
Nash equilibrium. However, they show that, when there is a price cap, no bubble can arise at
equilibrium if rationality is common knowledge: the unique dominance solvable equilibrium
involve all traders refusing to buy the asset.
We consider a repeated version of the above bubble game with a cap on the first price.
At the beginning of each period, each trader is endowed with 1 monetary unit that he can
use to buy the asset. If a trader in the previous position, if any, decided not to buy, a trader
obtains a trading profit of 0 since the game has stopped before his decision could matter.
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Being proposed to buy at a price P , if a trader chooses not to buy the asset, his profit from
this action is 0. If a trader decides to buy the asset, we assume that an outside financier
provides the remaining funds P−1 and shares the proceeds proportionately. The trader thus
obtains a trading profit of 9 if he is able to sell the asset to the next trader, and a trading
loss of −1 if he cannot sell back.
3.2 Experimental design
To test whether subjects’ experience influences bubble formation, we run an experiment in
which subjects participate in a sequence of independent bubble games. In order to study
the influence of complexity on learning and speculation, we vary the maximum number of
steps of reasoning required to reach the Nash equilibrium. The maximum number of steps
of reasoning is 2 when the cap on the first price is 1 while this number is 6 when the cap
is 10,000. The number of replications is either 10 or 20. We thus have four treatments: 30
subjects have participated in an experiment with a cap at 1 and 10 replications, 72 subjects
with a cap at 10,000 and 10 replications, 12 subjects with a cap at 1 and 20 replications,
and 18 subjects with a cap at 10,000 and 20 replications. A total of 132 subjects have
participated in our experiment. Subjects are junior and senior undergraduates in business
administration at the University of Toulouse.
In the experiment, we use a quasi-strategy method: the price proposed to the first subject
in the trading sequence is randomly drawn and the prices that could be proposed to the next
two subjects are functions of the first price. Subjects, according to their position in the
sequence, are proposed the corresponding price and indicate whether, if they were proposed
this price, they would buy or not the asset. This enables us to observe all three traders’
decisions, even if the first trader decides not to buy (a case in which the bubble does not start
and in which we could not have observed what other traders would have done). Because we
do not observe subjects’ decisions at all potential prices but only at the price that they could
be proposed given the draw of the first price, we are not in a full fledged strategy method.
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Subjects are offered one unit of experimental currency at the beginning of each replication.
Their trading payoffs are determined as indicated in Section 3.1. If they are not offered to
buy or decide not to buy the asset, their trading profit is zero. If they are able to buy and
resell the asset, their trading profit is 9. If they are not able to resell the asset to the next
subject, they make a trading loss of −1. The exchange rate we use in the experiment is
one Euro per experimental monetary unit. The instructions of the experiment with a cap at
10,000 are in Appendix A. The average gain in the experiment was 30 Euros. The overall
minimum and maximum payments in the experiment, including a 5 Euros show-up fee, were
5 Euros and 134 Euros. The experiment lasted between one hour and one hour and a half.
4 Experimental results
Our findings are summarized in Figure 1 which displays the evolution of average probability
to buy across replications (the solid red line on the graph). When the cap on the first price
is 1 (top graph), there are few steps of reasoning to reach the equilibrium and behavior
seems to converge to the no bubble equilibrium: the average probability to buy shows a
decreasing trend. However, when the cap on the first price is 10,000 (bottom graph), there
is no monotonically negative trend in the probability to buy.
To further document the evolution of speculative behavior in the experiment, Figure 2
displays the probability to buy across replications for the different price levels. The different
price levels are associated with different number of steps of reasoning and with a different
conditional probability to be last. When the cap on the first price is 1 (top graph), the
probability to buy seem to decrease at all price levels even if not monotonically. This is
consistent with the experimental findings of King et al. (1993) and Dufwenberg et al. (2005).
When the cap on the first price is 10,000 (bottom graph), behaviors seem different across
prices. When the price is 1, the probability to buy is constant at 100% after the first period.
When the price is 10, 100 and 1,000, the probability to buy seems to increase with experience.
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Figure 1: Data and predictions from learning models.
Probability to buy by period averaged across subjects and prices, as measured in the data.
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For the remaining prices, the probability to buy trends upward, downward or is flat. Overall,
there is some evidence that behavior evolves with experience but not always towards less
speculation.
In order to study whether we can identify learning in our data, we set up a panel logit
regression. We regress the likelihood that a subject buys the overvalued asset onto various
explanatory variables that reflect the probability to be last in the market sequence, the
number of steps of reasoning, and the result of past actions. For example, 1 Step=1 or 2 is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the number of steps of reasoning is 1 or 2,
1 0<P (last)<1 takes the value 1 if the probability to be last is strictly between 0 and 1, and
1 bought and lost at least once indicates that, in at least one previous replication, the subject has
bought the asset and could not sell it back. We control for subject and replication fixed
effects. In the analysis, 4 subjects were dropped because they never bought and 5 because
they always bought.
The results of the panel logit regression are in Table 1. The first regression specification
of Table 1 replicates the analysis of the one-shot game in Moinas and Pouget (2013) on
subjects’ decisions in the first period. We find that, as in Moinas and Pouget (2013), when
the probability to be last decreases and when the number of steps of reasoning increases,
subjects are more likely to speculate and buy the overvalued asset in the hope to resell it
at a profit. We complement these results, in the next two specifications, by showing how
past outcomes influence speculation, when subjects play multiple periods. We find that the
propensity to speculate goes down after a subject has bought the asset but was unable to
sell it back (the propensity to speculate appears larger after a subject has experienced a
profit from speculating in the past, but this result is not statistically significant). The third
specification indicates that this effect is significant especially when subjects are sure not to be
last. These results are consistent with adaptive learning being at work in our experimental
bubble market. The fact that they have already been proposed the highest potential price
seems not to affect the propensity to speculate, indicating that their speculation is not driven
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Figure 2: Data on the probability to speculate per price.
Probability to buy per price by period averaged across subjects, as measured in the data.
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by their lack of understanding of the game structure.
To summarize our results, Figure 3 plots the empirical frequencies of bubbles in our
experiment. Large, medium and small bubbles correspond to situations in which all three
subjects in a market have decided to buy the asset, only the first two subjects have bought,
and only the first subject has bought, respectively. The upper left graph displays the results
for the case in which there is a cap on the first price at 1 and there are 10 replications of the
game. It shows that the market experiences less and less bubbles over time. During the first
replication, no bubble occurs 30% of the time while, during the 10th replication, no bubble
occurs 80% of the time. As shown in the bottom left graph, bubbles are not eliminated by
experience when there is a large number of steps of reasoning as is the case when the cap on
the first price is 10,000. The two graphs on the right of the Figure show that the likelihood
of large bubbles is very high even after 20 replications of the experiment. More precisely,
as shown in the bottom right graph, large bubbles occurs around 30% of the time in the
first replication but almost 70% of the time in the twentieth replication when the cap on the
first price is 10,000. Overall, our experimental results suggest that learning is not likely to
shut down speculative bubbles quickly, especially when a high number of steps of reasoning
is needed.
5 A theory of bubbles based on adaptive learning
We present a model based on adaptive learning in which traders’ behavior evolves over time.
We then estimate the model using our experimental data.
5.1 The adaptive learning model
In our model, traders are assumed to adopt an adaptive behavior and adjust their choices
according to past performance. We capture adaptive behavior using a simplified version of
Camerer and Ho (1999)’ Experience-Weighted Attraction model that nests reinforcement
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(1) (2) (3)
Buy Decision Buy Decision Buy Decision
Constant -2.251** -6.456*** -6.819***
(-3.03) (-5.49) (-5.58)
11Step=1 or 2 × 110<P (last)<1 1.558 15.10 14.72
(1.37) (0.02) (0.02)
11Step=1 or 2 × 11P (last)=0 3.350*** 5.235*** 5.681***
(4.04) (9.05) (9.03)
11Step≥3 × 110<P (last)<1 2.308** 18.03 17.65
(2.83) (0.02) (0.02)
11Step≥3 × 11P (last)=0 5.619*** 21.66 21.97
(4.46) (0.03) (0.03)
Accumulated gains 0.0116 0.0113
(1.31) (1.26)
11has observed the max price at least once × 11P (last)<1 -0.349
(-0.78)
11bought and lost at least once × 11P (last)<1 -1.255***
(-3.68)
11bought and won at least once × 11P (last)<1 0.441
(1.28)
11bought and lost at least once × 110<P (last)<1 -0.766*
(1.79)
11bought and lost at least once × 11P (last)=0 -1.678***
(-3.93)
11bought and won at least once × 110<P (last)<1 0.484
(1.01)
11bought and won at least once × 11P (last)=0 0.251
(0.60)
Observations 132 1230 1230
Time and Subject Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Table 1: Regressions of the probability to speculate.
Regression of the likelihood that a subject buys the overvalued asset onto various explanatory variables that
reflect the probability to be last in the market sequence, the number of steps of reasoning, and the result
of past actions. We control for subject and replication fixed effects. In the panel analysis (columns 2 and
3), 4 subjects were dropped because they never bought and 5 because they always bought. T-statistics are
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (two tailed) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Figure 3: Data on the frequency of bubbles.
Large, medium and small bubbles correspond to situations in which all three subjects in a
market have decided to buy the asset, only the first two subjects have bought, and only the
first subject has bought, respectively.
and belief-based learning. Let ai(t) denote the action chosen by agent i at date t. An action
is denoted by j with j ∈ {B,∅} (B stands for a decision to buy, ∅ for a decision not to
buy). In our repeated trading game, at a given price P , the attraction of action j for trader
i at period t+ 1 is updated as follows:
Aji (t+ 1|P ) =

Aji (t|P ) +
[
δ + (1− δ)1j=ai(t)
]
pi(j, a−i(t)) if i is proposed price P
Aji (t|P ) otherwise
(1)
pi(j, a−i(t)) is the profit received by trader i if he chooses action j given other traders choosing
action a−i(t). 1j=ai(t) is an indicator function, which is equal to 1 if j = ai(t) and 0 otherwise.
In equation (1), the first part represents how the attraction of trader i’s action j conditional
on price P is updated if trader i is proposed a price P at period t; the second part represents
how this attraction is updated if trader i is not proposed price P at period t.1
1Note that traders may not be proposed any price in a given period, when one of the previous traders
has decided not to buy.
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δ is the imagination parameter that controls how much agents are able to display counter-
factual reasoning. When δ = 0, trader i reinforces the profit of action j only if it is selected
at period t, while when δ > 0, trader i reinforces the profit of action j no matter whether it
is actually chosen or not, provided that he is proposed the price P .
This adaptive learning model captures both the law of actual effect and the law of sim-
ulated effect. The law of actual effect means that the attraction of an action is adjusted
only if this action has been selected (δ = 0). If the action generates a positive profit, this
action will be more attractive, otherwise, it will be less attractive. This law is at the core
of reinforcement learning (see, for example, Roth and Erev (1995)). The law of simulated
effect indicates that the attraction of an action is adjusted according to the profit it could
have generated even if it has not been selected (δ > 0). This law is at the core of belief-based
learning (see, for example, Fudenberg and Levine (1998)).
According to the attraction, trader i decides the probability to choose action j at period
t+ 1 as follows:
Prji (t+ 1|P ) =
1
1 + eλ[A
−j
i (t|P )−Aji (t|P )]
(2)
where λ represents the responsiveness of traders to attractions. Equation (2) indicates that
the probability for trader i to choose action j is determined by its relative attraction in the
previous period.
To close the system, the initial values of Aji (0|P ) need to be specified. We set Aji (0|P ) = 0,
i.e. traders initially choose each action with the same probability.2
5.2 Simulation results
Our simulations consider two cases as in the experiments: price cap is 1 and 10, 000. For
both cases, we have a 2 × 2 design with δ being equal to 0 or 1, and λ being equal to 1 or
2Our version of the EWA learning model corresponds to the original version of Camerer and Ho (1999)
with ρ = 0 and φ = 1.
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1, 000. Our simulation proceeds as follows: for a given set of parameters, each simulation
contains 1, 000 independent trials; each trial contains 1, 000 runs, where each run represents
one trading session. In our experiments, at the end of each period, subjects have been
provided with information regarding the action of the next subject in the market sequence
only when he has bought (and when the previous trader, if any, has also bought). Therefore,
imagination, measured by δ, only matters in the case where a trader receives the highest
possible price and decides not to buy. In this case, the trader can imagine he would have
lost −1 if he had bought the asset.3
5.2.1 Individual trading behavior: Cap on the first price is 1
Figure 4 depicts the simulated average probability to buy at different prices. We first look
at the case in which δ = 0 and λ = 1 (upper left graph). Since the last trader can never sell
back the asset, he cannot gain if he chooses to buy and therefore he learns not to participate
in trading this asset. Due to lack of experience, the last trader initially chooses to buy with
a high probability (50% given the initial attractions). In this case, the second trader can sell
the asset at 10 times higher price with a high probability. He can gain from trading, thus
initially leading to more speculation. As time goes by, the last trader learns not to speculate
and the second trader is then less prone to speculate. The same pattern occurs for the first
trader, the only difference being that the first trader is more inclined to buy the asset due to
the higher speculation of the second trader. As a result, the convergence to no speculation
is very slow for the first trader.
Speculative behavior does not change dramatically if δ increases to 1, i.e., the maximal
level of imagination thanks to which agents adapt their behavior in response to the payoffs
they could have had. The simulations (bottom left) show that imagination leads to quicker
learning: initially, agents who are proposed the maximum price learn quickly not to speculate,
3A trader who buys can always use his imagination to compute the payoff he would received if he does
not buy. However, since the profit from not buying is equal to zero, imagination cannot affect the attraction
of the action not to buy.
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which induces the occurrence of bubbles to decrease more rapidly than in the case without
imagination.4
An increase in traders’ responsiveness to attractions, λ, reduces (but does not eliminate)
speculation, especially when δ = 0. Note that even in this case, the probability to buy of the
last trader may converge very slowly to zero (as in the upper right graph): when traders early
in the market sequence have already learnt not to speculate, the last trader is very rarely
offered the opportunity to buy (and thus to learn, because we assume that attractions are
specific to a given price and are updated only when this price is proposed to traders). This
result might explain why bubbles can be rekindled when experienced traders are confronted
with new market parameters as in Hussam, Porter and Smith (2008).
These results on individual behavior shed some light on the aggregate market behavior.
The fact that the first (respectively, last) traders in the market sequence initially learn to
(respectively, not to) speculate indicates that the likelihood of bubbles initially increases and
then takes some time to converge to zero.5 Second, imagination induces the first traders in
the market sequence to learn more strongly to speculate in the short run but also to learn
more quickly to converge to no speculation.
5.2.2 Individual trading behavior: Cap on the first price is 10, 000
As shown in Figure 5, raising the cap on the first price significantly fosters traders’ specula-
tion: with a price cap at 1, the trading approaches to the no bubble scenario within the 1,000
simulation runs. However, when the price cap is 10, 000, traders’ propensity to speculate
is very high even after 1, 000 runs: the probability to buy the asset at prices of 1, 10, 100
and 1,000 ends up greater than 70% when λ = 1. When λ = 1, 000, the probability to buy
decreases with experience but at a slower pace than when the price cap is 1.
4In Appendix B, we show that, when traders observe the actions of the subsequent traders and δ = 1, the
propensity to speculate is initially stronger than with no imagination because imaginative traders who are
proposed low prices realize that they could have obtained a higher payoff by buying the asset if subsequent
traders decided to buy.
5The fact that some traders see their propensity to speculate initially increase depends on the fact that
some traders in the market sequence buy with a probability larger than 10%.
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Figure 4: Probability to speculate per price in the EWA learning model when the cap on
the first price is 1.
This figure displays the average probability to buy in the bubble game as provided by the EWA learning
model of Camerer and Ho (1999). We set Aji (0|P ) = 0.
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Figure 5: Probability to speculate per price in the EWA learning model when the cap on
the first price is 10,000.
This figure displays the average probability to buy in the bubble game as provided by the EWA learning
model of Camerer and Ho (1999). We set Aji (0|P ) = 0.
20
5.3 Analytical results
In this subsection, we complement our simulation results and provide analytical results on
the propensity to speculate. We focus on the long run and the short run. The intermediate
case is much more difficult to analyze but it can be qualitatively understood by comparing
the short and the long run. The proofs are in Appendix C.
Our first proposition focuses on the long run convergence of the adaptive learning model
applied to the bubble game. This analysis is an application of the more general case studied
in Milgrom and Roberts (1991).
Proposition 1 Assume that λ > 0. In the long run, the trading game converges to the no
bubble equilibrium.
This result comes from the fact that the bubble game with a price cap is dominance
solvable. The trader with the highest price can only loose money by speculating. Adaptive
learning will thus lead to a decrease in the probability to buy the asset at this price towards
zero. Once this probability is low enough, the trader with the second highest price will also
see his probability to buy converge to zero. Eventually, all traders will see their probability
to buy converge to zero.
The short run situation is very different from the long run and is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that λ > 0. At period 1, traders randomly select between buy or
no buy with equal probability. At period 2, if a trader observes a price of 1 or 10, inducing
that he cannot be last in the market sequence, his expected probability to buy increases. If
a trader observes a price which is strictly higher than 10 and lower than the highest price,
his expected probability to buy increases if λ is small and decreases otherwise. If a trader
observes the highest price, his expected probability to buy always decreases.
Overall, we find that in the short run the propensity to speculate can increase especially
when the trader is sure he cannot be the last in market sequence. This is in line with our
21
experimental result as displayed in Table 1. We also find that, in the long run, traders learn
not to speculate. In the intermediate periods, we thus expect that a trader’s propensity to
speculate at a given price will decrease at some point in time as soon as the probability to
speculate of traders at the next price has become low enough.
5.4 Structural estimation of the learning model of speculation
We now estimate our version of the EWA learning model on the data generated in our
experiment using the Maximum Likelihood technique. This is useful in order to study the
type of adaptive learning that is at work: by estmating the EWA learning model, we can
determine whether people tend to use the law of actual effect only (i.e., whether the estimate
of the imagination parameter δ is zero) or whether they also use the law of simulated effect
(the estimate of δ is larger than zero).
Initial attractions are estimated from the behavior in the first replication of the experi-
ment and in the one-period experiment of Moinas and Pouget (2013).6 For the Maximum
Likelihood estimation, we restrict the set of parameter values as follows: δ is between 0 and
1 with increments of 0.05, and λ between 0 and 10 with increments of 0.05. We compute the
likelihood of the model for all the potential parameters’ values. The estimated parameters
correspond to the ones associated with the highest likelihood.
To compute confidence intervals for the parameters, we estimate the model several times
after dropping one or more replications at the end of the experiment. We do this in order
to keep the time dependency that is inherent to repeated experiments: we re-estimate the
model on 6, 7 or 8 first replications only (after the first replication which is not included in
the learning parameters’ estimation). Moreover, we also re-estimate the model by dropping
one of the experimental sessions. Overall, this provides us with 35 replications. For each
parameter, we drop the two minimum parameter values and the two maximum ones to get
an 11% confidence interval.
6We used data from the one-shot bubble game of Moinas and Pouget (2013) in order to have observations
at all prices, which is not the case in the present experiment.
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The results are displayed in Table 2. The first column corresponds to the model esti-
mation. Because subjects do not observe the subsequent trader’s decision, the parameter δ
can be only be identified for subjects who are proposed the highest price and decide not to
buy. The three other columns are offered for comparison. The second column corresponds
to the case in which δ is set to 0, i.e., traders learn but have no imagination; the third col-
umn corresponds to the case in which δ is set to 1, i.e., traders learn and have imagination.
Comparing these two columns enables one to assess the importance of the law of simulated
effect in our bubble experiment. Finally, the last column provides the likelihood of a model
in which there is no learning and the behavior of agents is fixed and similar to behavior in
the first period.
The results show that in our data, the learning model has a higher likelihood than the
fixed behavior model. The difference in log-likelihood is statistically significant according
to a Vuong test (the p-value is lower than 1%). This is in line with our previous regression
results indicating that adaptive learning is at play in our experiments and is an important
element in speculative behavior.
We also find that imagination does not play a large role in our experiment. According to
Vuong tests, the maximum likelihood of the learning model is significantly larger when δ is
unconstrained than when it is constrained to 0 or to 1 (the p-values are equal to 0.03). The
improvements however appear relatively small compared to the improvement in maximum
likelihood between the learning models and the no-learning benchmark. This is not to say
that imagination is not important for speculation. Indeed, in our experiment, when a subject
decided not to buy, he was not told what the next subject in the market sequence (if any)
wanted to do. He thus had no data on which to apply his potential imagination. To study
this issue further and test whether imagination is important for speculation decisions, it
would be interesting to run an experiment in which subjects were told what the next subject
wanted to do.
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Unconstrained δ δ = 0 δ = 1 No learning
λ 0.20 0.20 0.20 > 0
δ 0.45 0.00 1.00
Max L -571.17 -571.33 -571.36 -594.73
Contribution of cap = 1
Max L -275.92 -276.08 -276.11 -290.80
Contribution of cap = 10, 000
Max L -295.25 -295.25 -295.25 -303.93
Bootstrapped confidence intervals
min λ 0.15 0.15 0.15 > 0
max λ 0.25 0.25 0.20
min δ 0.00
max δ 0.50
Average Max L -425.96 -426.01 -426.30 -438.90
Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimations of the imagination and responsiveness parameters
of the EWA learning model.
This table shows the results of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the imagination parameter δ, and
responsiveness parameter, λ, of the EWA learning model. Initial attractions are set up to fit the behavior
of subjects as displayed in the first period and in Moinas and Pouget (2013). Confidence intervals are
obtained bootstrapping. 35 estimations are done taking into account the time dependence: 8 estimations
after dropping one of the 8 sessions, 1 estimation after dropping the last period; 8 estimations after dropping
one of the 8 sessions and the last period; 1 estimation after dropping the last two periods; 8 estimations after
dropping one of the 8 sessions and the last two periods; 1 estimation after dropping the last three periods;
8 estimations after dropping one of the 8 sessions and the last three periods. 89% confidence intervals are
obtained by dropping the 4 most extreme estimates of each parameter out of the 35 estimations.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study whether traders’ experience reduces their propensity to speculate.
We theoretically study a financial market populated by adaptive traders. Following Camerer
and Ho (1999)’s Experience-Weighted Attraction learning model, these traders are assumed
to adjust their behavior according to actions’ past performance. The EWA model nests
reinforcement learning, on the one hand, and belief-based learning, according to which agents
use their imagination to do counter-factual reasoning, on the other hand.
We focus on the Bubble Game designed by Moinas and Pouget (2013) in which agents
sequentially trade a worthless asset. Speculation may arise because agents do not always
know where they stand in the market sequence. In the version of the Bubble Game we
consider, because there is a cap on the maximum price that can be achieved, no rational
bubbles can form.
The learning model shows that, in the long-run, the market converges to the unique
no bubble equilibrium. However, we also find that learning may initially increase traders’
propensity to speculate: this is because as long as not all traders have learned not to spec-
ulate, some traders can make substantial profit by speculating. In the short run, more
experienced traders thus create more bubbles. Moreover, we show that this effect is stronger
when traders are more sophisticated and when the price cap is higher.
We provide experimental evidence that is consistent with these theoretical results. First,
adaptive learning is at work in speculative markets: their past payoffs have a statistically
significant impact on the propensity of subjects to speculate. Secondly, the propensity to
speculate and the occurrence of bubbles are reduced with experience when the price cap
is low but not when it is high. Overall, our findings reconcile the experimental results of
King et al. (1993) and Dufwenberg et al. (2005) who show that experience attenuates the
formation of speculative bubbles, and those of Hussam et al. (2008) and Deck et al. (2014)
who show that bubbles may occur with experienced traders when market parameters change
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and when new traders enter the market.
In future work, it would be interesting to study how traders learn when they can observe
other traders’ behavior. This would allow one to investigate how observing a bubble inflating
affects the propensity to speculate of a trader who has not yet decided to ride the bubble. In
the context of the bubble game, this could be captured by enabling agents to observe what
the next trader in the market sequence has done. In this context, imagination could play a
more important role than in our setting in which it appears not to affect learning.
26
Appendix A Instructions
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Welcome to this market game. Please read carefully the following instructions. They 
are identical for all participants. Please do not communicate with the other participants. The 
game will last approximately one hour, including the reading of the instructions. 
You will be able to earn some money during the game. Your total gain will be paid to 
you on March 27th, 2017. 
 
Trading process 
 
To play this game, we form groups of three players. Each player is endowed with one 
experimental currency unit (ECU) that can be used to buy an asset. Your task during the game 
is to decide whether you want to buy or not the asset. This asset does not generate any dividend. 
If the asset price exceeds 1 ECU, you can still buy the asset. We indeed consider that a financial 
partner (who is not part of the game) provides you with the additional capital and shares profits 
with you according to the respective capital invested. The market proceeds sequentially. A 
proposal to buy at a price P1 is made to the first player. If he buys, he proposes to sell the asset 
to the second player at a price which is ten times higher, P2=10*P1. If the second player accepts 
to buy, the first player ends up the game with 10 ECU. Otherwise, the first player ends up with 
nothing. If he or she accepted to buy, the second player then proposes to sell the asset to the 
third trader at a price P3=10*P2=100*P1. If the third player buys the asset, the second player 
ends up the game with 10 ECU. Otherwise, the second player ends up with nothing. The third 
player does not find anybody to whom he or she can sell the asset. Since this asset does not 
generate any dividend, he or she ends up the game with nothing. If a player refuses to buy, he 
or she ends up the game with 1 ECU (so do all the player after him or her in the market 
sequence). 
At the beginning of the game, players do not know their position in the market sequence. 
Positions are randomly determined with one chance out of three for each player to be first, 
second or third. The game is summarized in the following figure. 
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Proposed prices 
 
The price P1 that is proposed to the first player is random. This price is a power of 10 
and is determined as follows: 
 
Price P1 Probability that this price is realized 
1 1/2 (50%) 
10 1/4 (25%) 
100 1/8 (12.5%) 
1,000 1/16 (6.25%) 
10,000 1/16 (6.25%) 
 
Players’ decisions are made simultaneously and privately. For example, if the first price 
P1=1 is drawn, the prices that are simultaneously proposed to the three players are: P1=1 for 
the first player, P2=10 for the second player, and P3=100 for the third player. Identically, if the 
first price P1=10,000 has been drawn, the prices that are simultaneously proposed to the three 
players are: P1=10,000 for the first player, P2 = 100,000 for the second player, and 
P3=1,000,000 for the third player. 
The price that you are been proposed can give you the following information regarding 
your position in the market sequence:  
§ if you are proposed to buy at a price of 1, you are sure to be first in the market sequence; 
§ if you are proposed to buy at a price of 10, you have one chance out of three to be first and 
two chances out of three to be second in the market sequence. You are sure not to be last; 
§ if you are proposed to buy at a price of 100 or 1,000, you have one chance out of seven to 
be first, two chances out of seven to be second, and four chances out seven to be last in the 
market sequence;  
§ if you are proposed to buy at a price of 10,000, you have one chance out of four to be first, 
one chance out of four to be second, and two chances out four to be last in the market 
sequence; 
§ if you are proposed to buy at a price of 100,000, you have one chance out of two to be 
second, and one chance out of two to be third; in this case, you are sure not to be first in the 
market sequence; 
§ if you are proposed to buy at a price of 1,000,000, you are sure to be last in the market 
sequence. 
 
****** 
 
Outcomes and final gain 
 
You are going to participate in 10 independent periods of the game. The composition of 
each group is anonymous, randomly determined and different at each period of the game. After 
each period, once decisions are made, we will indicate (anonymously) if you were proposed to 
buy the asset and at what price. We will also indicate your gain for this period and your overall 
gain. 
At the end of the ten periods of the game, we will compute your total gain as the sum of 
the gains in each period. Your total gain will be paid to you in euros. The rate of exchange is: 
1 € for 1 ECU. 
 
Do you have any question? 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
• Is it possible to be first and be proposed to buy at a price of 100.000? 
§ Yes 
§ No 
 
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 1, are you sure to be first? 
§ Yes 
§ No 
 
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 100.000, are you sure to be second? 
§ Yes 
§ No 
 
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 100, are you sure to be third? 
§ Yes 
§ No 
 
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 1.000.000, are you sure to be third ? 
§ Yes 
§ No 
 
• If you accept to buy at 100, you will propose to resell at 
§ 1.000 
§ 1.100 
 
• If you are first, buy at 100, and resell at 1,000, your payoff in the game is 
§ 10 euros 
§ 900 euros 
 
• If you are first, buy at 100, and find nobody to resell to at 1,000, your payoff in the game 
is 
§ 0 euro 
§ 10 euros 
 
• If you refuse to buy, your payoff is 
§ 1 euro 
§ 0 euro 
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Appendix B Simulations when a trader observes sub-
sequent trader’s behavior
This appendix displays the results of simulations for the same game as in the experiment
except that it is assumed that traders can observe the decision of the next trader in the
market sequence. Figure 6 refers to the case in which the price cap is 1. Figure 7 refers to
the case in which the price cap is 10,000.
When traders observe the actions of the subsequent trader, the propensity to speculate is
initially stronger than with no imagination because imaginative traders who are proposed low
prices realize that they could have obtained a higher payoff by buying the asset if subsequent
traders decided to buy. The speed at which traders learn is then faster.
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Figure 6: Probability to speculate per price in the EWA learning model when the cap on
the first price is 1. Setting in which a trader observes subsequent trader’s behavior.
This figure displays the average probability to buy in the Bubble game assuming that traders can observe
the choice of the next trader in the market sequence. Behavior is modeled as in the EWA learning model of
Camerer and Ho (1999). We set Aji (0|P ) = 0.
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Figure 7: Probability to speculate per price in the EWA learning model when the cap on
the first price is 10,000. Setting in which a trader observes subsequent trader’s behavior.
This figure displays the average probability to buy in the Bubble game assuming that traders can observe
the choice of the next trader in the market sequence. Behavior is modeled as in the EWA learning model of
Camerer and Ho (1999). We set Aji (0|P ) = 0.
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Appendix C Proofs of the analytical results
Notations – In all the proofs below, K ∈ {0, 4} is the cap on the initial price (i.e., the
highest price observed is P = 10K+2), ai(t) is the action chosen by agent i at date t, the set
of potential actions j is {B,∅} where B stands for a decision to buy, ∅ for a decision not
to buy, Aji (t+ 1|P ) is the attraction of action j at period t+ 1 for agent i updated as shown
in equation (1), and Prji (t+ 1|P ) is the probability for agent i to choose action j at period
t+ 1 defined in equation (2). Denote i− and i+ as the previous and next trader for trader i.
In all the proofs below, we exclude the case in which λ = 0. In this case indeed, the
expected probability to buy is constant and equal to 1
2
regardless of the price, the period
and the past experience.
Proposition 1 – Proof.
We want to show that for any trader i, his probability to buy given any price P will
converge to 0 in the long run.
From equation (2), the probability to buy of trader i given price P at period t + 1 is
determined by the difference between his attraction for the action not to buy and that of his
action to buy conditional on price P at period t, i.e., A∅i (t|P )− ABi (t|P ).
Applying equation (1) to both actions for trader i, we have:
A∅i (t|P )− ABi (t|P ) = A∅i (t− 1|P )− ABi (t− 1|P ) + ∆pii(t|P ), (3)
where we define ∆pii(t|P ) as the incremental payoff between the two actions. Computation
yields:
∆pii(t|P ) =

[
δ + (1− δ)11∅=ai(t)
]
pi(∅, a−i(t))−
[
δ + (1− δ)11B=ai(t)
]
pi(B, a−i(t)) if i observes P
0 otherwise
(4)
Whether the probability to buy of trader i would increase or decrease between t and t + 1
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thus depends on ∆pii(t|P ).
• First, we show that no bubble arises on the highest price, i.e., P = 10K+2, in the long
run. In the case where P = 10K+2, if trader i does not buy, his payoff does not depend
on the actions of the others: pi(∅, a−i(t)) = 0. If the trader buys, his payoff depends on
the actions of the previous traders; however, given that he observes the highest price,
he will never be able to resell the asset, thus pi(B, a−i(t)) ∈ {0,−1}. It follows that
∆pii(t|10K+2) can only take three values, 0, δ or 1:
∆pii(t|10K+2) =

1 trader i observes price 10K+2 and chooses to buy
δ trader i observes price 10K+2 and chooses not to buy
0 otherwise
(5)
Iterating equation (3) from period 1 to t, and using our assumption that A∅i (0|P ) =
ABi (0|P ) = 0 to initialize the series, the probability to buy at period t+ 1 conditional
on the highest price for trader i can be written as:
PrBi (t+ 1|10K+2) =
1
1 + eλ
∑t
τ=1 ∆pii(τ |10K+2)
. (6)
From the discussion above, we have ∆pii(t|10K+2) ≥ 0.
– Case I: the probability for trader i observing price 10K+2 does not converge to
0 as t → +∞, i.e., the probability to buy with second and third largest price
does not converge to 0. In this case, we suppose that the probability to buy
conditional on the highest price does not converge to 0 either. It implies that
∆pii(t|10K+2) > 0 always holds at each period with a non-negligible probability.
Thus, plimt→∞
∑t
τ=1 ∆pii(τ |10K+2) = +∞ and plimt→∞PrBi (t+ 1|10K+2) = 0. It
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contradicts the initial assumption! Thus, the probability to buy given the highest
price will converge to 0 as t→ +∞.
– Case II: the probability for trader i observing price 10K+2 converges to 0 when
t→ +∞, i.e., the probability to buy with second or third largest price converges
to 0. In this case, trading already stops at the second or third largest price. Thus,
no bubble arises with the highest price either.
• Second, we show that no bubble arises on the second highest price, i.e., P = 10K+1, in
the long run.
– First, we consider the case where the probability to buy given the highest prices
converge to 0 in the long run. That is, ∀ > 0, δ > 0, there exists a T , such that
t > T , Pr(
∣∣PrBi (t|10K+2)− 0∣∣ > ) < δ. We consider the case where t ≥ T , the
probability to buy conditional on the second highest price for any trader j is
PrBj (t+ 1|10K+1) =
1
1 + e−λA
B
j (T−1|10K+1)eλ
∑t
τ=T ∆pii(τ |10K+2)
, (7)
where e−λA
B
j (T−1|10K+1) is bounded and ∆pii(t|10K+1) are as follows:
∆pii(t|10K+1) =

1 trader i observes price 10K+1 and buys but cannot sell
−9 trader i observes price 10K+1 and buys and is able to sell
0 otherwise
(8)
∗ Case I: the probability for trader j observing price 10K+1 does not converge
to 0 as t → +∞, i.e., the probability to buy with third or fourth largest
price does not converge to 0. In this case, we suppose that the probability to
buy conditional on the second highest price does not converge to 0 either. It
implies that ∆pii(t|10K+1) > 0 happens at each period with a non-negligible
probability.
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Since ∀ > 0, δ > 0, there exists a T , such that t > T , Pr(∣∣PrBi (t|10K+2)− 0∣∣
> ) < δ. Intuitively, if trader j observes price 10K+1, his probability to sell,
i.e., the probability that ∆pii(t|10K+1) = −9, converges to 0 as t is sufficiently
large. In summary, the probability that ∆pii(t|10K+1) ≥ 0 approaches to 1 and
∆pii(t|10K+1) > 0 happens with a non-negligible probability at each period
when t is sufficiently large. Thus, plimt→∞
∑t
τ=T ∆pii(τ |10K+1) = +∞. Since
e−λA
B
j (T−1|10K+1) is bounded, we obtain that plimt→∞ PrBi (t + 1|10K+1) = 0.
It contradicts the initial assumption! Thus, the probability to buy given the
second highest price converges to 0 in the long run.
∗ Case II: the probability for trader j observing price 10K+1 converges to 0
when t→ +∞, i.e., the probability to buy with third or fourth largest price
converges to 0. In this case, trading already stops at the third or second
largest price. Thus, no bubble arises with the second highest price either.
– Second, we consider the case where no bubble arises for the highest price because
that trading already stops at the second or third largest price. It is obvious that,
in this case, no bubble arises with the second highest price either.
• Last, according to the same reasoning, the same analysis can be applied to the traders
with other lower prices and we can show that no bubble arises conditional on those
prices. Therefore, in the long run, the trading should converge to no bubble equilib-
rium.
Proposition 2 – Proof.
At period 1, the probability to buy for any trader at any price is 1
2
since the initial
attractions are assumed to be 0. Let us analyze whether the probability to buy of a trader
i at period 2 for any price P ∈ {1, ..., 10k, ..., 10K+2} is higher or smaller than 1
2
.
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Let us denote by qPr the probability for a trader who is in position r ∈ {1, 2, 3} in the
market sequence to observe price P . More precisely, qP1 = Pr(First observes P ), q
P
2 =
Pr(Second observes P ), and qP3 = Pr(Third observes P ). We have:
q10
k
1 = q
10k+1
2 = q
10k+2
3 =

1
2
k+1
if k < K
1
2
K
if k = K
0 if k > K.
(9)
At period 1, there are four different potential cases. Trader i will observe price P with
probability 1
3
(qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3 ). His incremental payoff between not buy and buy thus writes
as follows:
• With probability Pr(First observes P ⋂ i is First) = 1
3
qP1 , trader i observes price P
and is in first position. In this case,
∆pii(1|P ) =

−9 if ai(1) = B and ai+(1) = B
(
1
4
)
1 if ai(1) = B and ai+(1) = ∅
(
1
4
)
0 if ai(1) = ∅
(
1
2
) (10)
If trader i buys the asset and the next trader also buys the asset, which happens with
probability 1
4
, the incremental payoff the trader i can obtain between not buy and buy
is −9. If trader i buys the asset but the next trader refuses to buy, which happens
with probability 1
4
, the incremental payoff is 1. Finally, if trader i refuses to buy, which
happens with probability 1
2
, the incremental payoff is 0. In the latter case, imagination
for what would happen if he had bought would not kick in since trader i is not provided
the information on the next trader.
• With probability Pr(Second observes P ⋂ i is Second) = 1
3
qP2 , trader i observes price
P and is in second position. This yields:
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∆pii(1|P ) =

0 if ai−(1) = ∅
(
1
2
)
−9 if ai−(1) = B and ai(1) = B and ai+(1) = B
(
1
8
)
1 if ai−(1) = B and ai(1) = B and ai+(1) = ∅
(
1
8
)
0 if ai−(1) = B and ai(1) = ∅
(
1
4
)
(11)
In this case, the incremental payoff not only depends on the action of the next trader,
but also on that of the previous one. If the previous trader chooses not to buy, which
happens with probability 1
2
, the incremental payoff is 0; otherwise, the three cases are
similar to those described below equation (10).
• With probability Pr(Third observes P ⋂ i is Third) = 1
3
qP3 , trader i observes price P
and is in third position. Following the same reasoning as above, if P < 10K+2, we
have:
∆pii(1|P ) =

1 if ai(1) = B and ai−(1) = B and ai−−(1) = B
(
1
8
)
0 otherwise
(
7
8
) (12)
In this case, the incremental payoff depends on not only the action of trader i but also
the actions of the previous two traders. If the previous two traders and trader i choose
to buy, which happens with probability 1
8
, the incremental payoff is 1; otherwise, the
incremental payoff is 0.
The case in which trader i observes the highest possible price, i.e., P = 10K+2 is slightly
different: in that case indeed, a trader who would not buy could still imagine the payoff
he would have received if he had bought given that he infers from P his position in the
market sequence. This yields:
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∆pii(1|10K+2) =

1 if ai(1) = B and ai−(1) = B and ai−−(1) = B
(
1
8
)
δ if ai(1) = ∅ and ai−(1) = B and ai−−(1) = B
(
1
8
)
0 otherwise
(
3
4
) (13)
In this case, the incremental payoff is 1 if all the three traders choose to buy, and δ if
the first two traders choose to buy and trader i chooses not to buy since he can imagine
that he would have received −1 if he had bought. For other cases, the incremental
payoff is 0.
• With probability 1−1
3
(
qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3
)
, trader i does not observe price P and ∆pii(1|P ) =
0.
To sum up, the incremental payoff trader i can obtain between not buy and buy is as
follows: for price P < 10K+2
∆pii(1|P ) =

0 with prob. 1− 1
3
(qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3 ) +
1
6
(qP1 +
3
2
qP2 +
7
4
qP3 )
1 with prob. 1
12
(qP1 +
1
2
qP2 +
1
2
qP3 )
−9 with prob. 1
12
(qP1 +
1
2
qP2 ),
(14)
and for the highest possible price P = 10K+2:
∆pii(1|10K+2) =

0 with prob. 1− 1
3
(qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3 ) +
1
6
(qP1 +
3
2
qP2 +
3
2
qP3 )
1 with prob. 1
12
(qP1 +
1
2
qP2 +
1
2
qP3 )
−9 with prob. 1
12
(qP1 +
1
2
qP2 )
δ with prob. 1
24
qP3
(15)
40
We now compared the probability to buy at period 2 with the probability to buy at
period 1 which is 1
2
. From equation (2), the probability to buy for trader i conditional on
price P at period 2 can be written as:
PrBi (2|P ) =
1
1 + eλ∆pii(1|P )
, (16)
where ∆pii(1|P ) is distributed according to equation (14) if P < 10K+2 and equation (15) if
P = 10K+2.
We can see that the expected probability to buy at period 2 for trader i if P < 10K+2 is
E1(Pr
B
i (2|P )) =
[
1− 1
3
(qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3 ) +
1
6
(qP1 +
3
2
qP2 +
7
4
qP3 )
]
× 1
2
+
1
12
(qP1 +
1
2
qP2 +
1
2
qP3 )×
1
1 + eλ
+
1
12
(qP1 +
1
2
qP2 )×
1
1 + e−9λ
,
(17)
and the expected probability to buy at period 2 for trader i if P = 10K+2 is
E1(Pr
B
i (2|10K+2)) =
[
1− 1
3
(qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3 ) +
1
6
(qP1 +
3
2
qP2 +
3
2
qP3 )
]
× 1
2
+
1
12
(qP1 +
1
2
qP2 +
1
2
qP3 )×
1
1 + eλ
+
1
12
(qP1 +
1
2
qP2 )×
1
1 + e−9λ
+
1
24
qP3
1
1 + eλδ
.
(18)
Finally, the expected probability can be simplified as follows:
E1(Pr
B
i (2|P )) =

1
12
[
6− qP1 − q
P
2
2 − q
P
3
4 +
qP1 +
qP2
2
1+e−9λ +
2qP1 +q
P
2 +q
P
3
2(1+eλ)
]
if P < 10K+2
1
24
[
12 + (2qP1 + q
P
2 )(
1
1+eλ
+ 1
1+e−9λ − 1) + qP3 ( 11+eλ + 11+eδλ − 1)
]
if P = 10K+2.
(19)
It is useful to compute the probabilities qPr for r ∈ {1, 2, 3} in equation (9) explicitly.
Tables 3 and 4 show the values of these probabilities for any price P when the cap on the
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Table 3: Price Cap on the first price is 1
Price P qP1 q
P
2 q
P
3 E1(Pr
B
i (2|P ))
1 1 0 0 1
12
(
5 + 1
1+e−9λ +
1
1+eλ
)
10 0 1 0 1
24
(
11 + 1
1+e−9λ +
1
1+eλ
)
100 0 0 1 1
24
(
11 + 1
1+eλ
+ 1
1+eδλ
)
Table 4: Price Cap on the first price is 104
Price P qP1 q
P
2 q
P
3 E1(Pr
B
i (2|P ))
1 1
2
0 0 1
24
(
11 + 1
1+e−9λ +
1
1+eλ
)
10 1
4
1
2
0 1
24
(
11 + 1
1+e−9λ +
1
1+eλ
)
102 1
8
1
4
1
2
1
24
(
45
4
+ 1
2
1
1+e−9λ +
1
1+eλ
)
103 1
16
1
8
1
4
1
192
(
93 + 2
1+e−9λ +
4
1+eλ
)
104 1
16
1
16
1
8
1
384
(
188 + 3
1+e−9λ +
5
1+eλ
)
105 0 1
16
1
16
1
768
(
381 + 2
1+e−9λ +
4
1+eλ
)
106 0 0 1
16
1
384
(
191 + 1
1+eλ
+ 1
1+eλδ
)
first price are 1 and 104 respectively. Notice that 0 ≤ qP1 + qP2 + qP3 ≤ 1.
• First, we analyze the case where trader i observes the highest price. Notice that
q10
K+2
1 = q
10K+2
2 = 0 and q
10K+2
3 > 0. If trader i observes the highest price, we obtain
from equation (19) that
E1(Pr
B
i (2|10K+2)) =
1
24
[
12 + q10
K+2
3 (
1
1 + eλ
+
1
1 + eδλ
− 1)
]
,
which is strictly lower than 1
24
[
12 + q10
K+2
3 (
1
2
+ 1
2
− 1)
]
= 1
2
for λ > 0 and δ ≥ 0. The
probability to buy of a trader who observes the highest price is expected to decrease
immediately between period 1 and period 2.
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• Second, let us analyze the cases where trader i observes the two lowest prices, P = 1
or P = 10. Notice that trader i can never be last, i.e., q13 = q
10
3 = 0. It follows from
equation (19) that:
E1(Pr
B
i (2|P )) =
1
12
[
6− qP1 −
1
2
qP2 + (q
P
1 +
qP2
2
)(
1
1 + e−9λ
+
1
1 + eλ
)
]
.
Now, we have if λ > 0:
1
1 + e−9λ
+
1
1 + eλ
=1− 1
1 + e9λ
+
1
1 + eλ
> 1− 1
1 + eλ
+
1
1 + eλ
= 1
Based on the above two results, we can see that the expected probability to buy at
period 2 when P ∈ {1, 10} satisfies
E1(Pr
B
i (2|P )) >
1
12
[
6− qP1 −
1
2
qP2 + (q
P
1 +
qP2
2
)
]
=
1
2
Therefore, the expected probability to buy increases for prices 1 and 10 at period 2
whatever the cap on the initial price.
• Third, when the cap is K = 4, let us analyze the cases where trader i observes the
price is 10k, where k = 2, 3, 4, 5. To this end, we differentiate the expected probability
to buy defined in equation (19) with respect to λ, using the exact values of qPr defined
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in Table 4. Computation yields:
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|102))
∂λ
=
1
48
eλ
(
9e8λ
(1 + e9λ)2
− 2
(1 + eλ)2
)
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|103))
∂λ
=
1
96
eλ
(
9e8λ
(1 + e9λ)2
− 2
(1 + eλ)2
)
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|104))
∂λ
=
1
384
eλ
(
27e8λ
(1 + e9λ)2
− 5
(1 + eλ)2
)
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|105))
∂λ
=
2
768
eλ
(
9e8λ
(1 + e9λ)2
− 2
(1 + eλ)2
)
It is easy to show that the first order differentiation is strictly positive if and only
if 0 ≤ λ < λ∗(P ), where λ∗(P ) ∈ (0,+∞). That is, for all P ∈ {102, 103, 104, 105},
there exists a λ∗(P ) ∈ (0,+∞) such that the expected probability to buy at price P
increases with λ when λ ≤ λ∗(P ) and decreases with λ when λ > λ∗(P ).
When λ = 0, the expected probability to buy at period 2 is constant and equal to 1
2
regardless of the price. When λ → +∞, the expected probability to buy at period 2
are 47
96
, 95
192
, 191
384
and 383
768
at prices 102, 103, 104 and 105 respectively. These probabilities
are all lower than 1
2
. Therefore, there exists a λ′(P ) ∈ (0,+∞) such that the expected
probability to buy at period 2 is greater than 1
2
if λ ∈ (0, λ′(P )) and lower than 1
2
if
λ ∈ (λ′(P ),+∞).
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Appendix D Traders’ speculation in the short term
given the initial probabilities from the ex-
perimental data
Notations – In all the proofs below, PrBi (t|P,K) represents the probability to buy for
trader i at period t conditional on price P in the case where the price cap on the first price
is 10K . Aji (t|P,K) represents the attraction of trader i at period t conditional on price P in
the case where the price cap on the first price is 10K , where j ∈ {B,∅} and K ∈ {0, 4}.
Proof.
From the first replications of the experiment, we know that: in the case where K = 0,
the probabilities to buy at first period PrBi (1|P, 0) are 80.00%, 55.00% and 10.00% when the
price P is 1, 10, and 100 respectively. In the case where K = 4, the probabilities to buy at
first period PrBi (1|P, 4) are 95.24%, 94.29%, 62.50%, 50.00%, 60.00%, 20.00% and 10.00%
when price P is 1, 10, ..., 105 and 106 respectively. We analyze whether the probability to
buy of a trader i at period 2 will increase or decrease relative to that at period 1.
At period 1, there are four different potential cases. Trader i observes price P with
probability 1
3
(qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3 ), where q
P
1 , q
P
2 and q
P
3 satisfy equation (9). The attraction of
trader i at period 2 is updated as follows:
• With probability Pr(First observes P ⋂ i is First) = 1
3
qP1 , trader i observes price P
and is in first position. In this case,
ABi (1|P,K) = ABi (0|P,K) +

9 if ai(1) = ai+(1) = B (b1)
−1 if ai(1) = B and ai+(1) = ∅ (b2)
0 if ai(1) = ∅ (b3)
(20)
where
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b1 = Pr
B
i (1|P,K)PrBi (1|10P,K),
b2 = Pr
B
i (1|P,K)
(
1− PrBi (1|10P,K)
)
,
and b3 = 1− PrBi (1|P,K).
If trader i buys the asset and the next trader also buys the asset, which happens
with probability b1, the attraction of buying for trader i will add profit 9. If trader
i buys the asset but the next trader refuses to buy, which happens with probability
b2, the attraction will add loss −1. If trader i refuses to buy, which happens with
probability b3, the attraction will be exactly the same as the initial one. In the latter
case, imagination for what would happen if he had bought would not kick in since
trader i is not provided the information on the next trader.
• With probability Pr(Second observes P ⋂ i is Second) = 1
3
qP2 , trader i observes price
P and is in second position. This yields:
ABi (1|P,K) = ABi (0|P,K) +

0 if ai−(1) = ∅ (b4)
9 if ai−(1) = ai(1) = ai+(1) = B (b5)
−1 if ai−(1) = ai(1) = B and ai+(1) = ∅ (b6)
0 if ai−(1) = B and ai(1) = ∅ (b7)
(21)
where
b4 = 1− PrBi (1| P10 , K),
b5 = Pr
B
i (1| P10 , K)PrBi (1|P,K)PrBi (1|10P,K),
b6 = Pr
B
i (1| P10 , K)PrBi (1|P,K)
(
1− PrBi (1|10P,K)
)
and b7 = Pr
B
i (1| P10 , K)
(
1− PrBi (1|P,K)
)
.
In this case, the attraction not only depends on the action of the next trader, but also on
that of the previous one. If the previous trader chooses not to buy, which happens with
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probability b4, the attraction is exactly the same as the initial attractions; otherwise,
the three cases are similar to those described below equation (20).
• With probability Pr(Third observes P ⋂ i is Third) = 1
3
qP3 , trader i observes price P
and is in third position. Following the same reasoning as above, if P < 10K+2, we
have:
ABi (1|P,K) = ABi (0|P,K) +

−1 if ai(1) = ai−(1) = ai−−(1) = B (b8)
0 otherwise (b9)
(22)
where
b8 = Pr
B
i (1| P100 , K)PrBi (1| P10 , K)PrBi (1|P,K),
and b9 = 1− PrBi (1| P100 , K)PrBi (1| P10 , K)PrBi (1|P,K).
In this case, the attraction depends on not only the action of trader i but also the
actions of the previous two traders. If all the three traders choose to buy, which
happens with probability b8, the attraction will add −1; otherwise, the attraction is
exactly the same as the initial attraction.
The case in which trader i observes the highest possible price, i.e., P = 10K+2 is slightly
different: in that case indeed, a trader who would not buy could still imagine the payoff
he would have received if he had bought given that he infers from P his position in the
market sequence. This yields:
ABi (1|10K+2,K) = ABi (0|10K+2,K) +

−1 if ai(1) = ai−(1) = ai−−(1) = B (b10)
−δ if ai(1) = ∅ and ai−(1) = ai−−(1) = B (b11)
0 otherwise (b12)
(23)
where
b10 = Pr
B
i (1| P100 , K)PrBi (1| P10 , K)PrBi (1|P,K),
b11 = Pr
B
i (1| P100 , K)PrBi (1| P10 , K)
(
1− PrBi (1|P,K)
)
,
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and b12 = 1− PrBi (1| P100 , K)PrBi (1| P10 , K).
In this case, the attraction will add −1 if all the three traders choose to buy, and −δ if
the first two traders choose to buy and trader i chooses not to buy since he can imagine
that he would have received −1 if he had bought. For other cases, the incremental
payoff is 0.
• With probability 1−1
3
(
qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3
)
, trader i does not observe price P andABi (1|P,K) =
ABi (0|P,K).
To sum up, the attraction of buying for trader i is as follows: if price P < 10K+2, we
have
ABi (1|P,K) = ABi (0|P,K) +

0 with prob. c1
−1 with prob. c2
9 with prob. c3,
(24)
where
c1 =
1
3
qP1 b3 +
1
3
qP2 (b4 + b7) +
1
3
qP3 b9 + 1−
1
3
(qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3 ),
c2 =
1
3
qP1 b2 +
1
3
qP2 b6 +
1
3
qP3 b8,
c3 =
1
3
qP1 b1 +
1
3
qP2 b5.
(25)
If P = 10K+2, we have
ABi (1|10K+2, K) = ABi (0|10K+2, K) +

0 with prob. c4
−1 with prob. c5
9 with prob. c6
−δ with prob. c7.
(26)
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where
c4 =
1
3
qP1 b3 +
1
3
qP2 (b4 + b7) +
1
3
qP3 b12 + 1−
1
3
(qP1 + q
P
2 + q
P
3 ),
c5 =
1
3
qP1 b2 +
1
3
qP2 b6 +
1
3
qP3 b10,
c6 =
1
3
qP1 b1 +
1
3
qP2 b5,
c7 =
1
3
qP3 b11.
(27)
From equation (2), the probability to buy for trader i conditional on price P at period 2
is:
PrBi (2|P,K) =
1
1 + e−λABi (1|P,K)
, (28)
where ABi (1|P,K) is distributed according to equation (24) if P < 10K+2 and equation (26)
if P = 10K+2.
We obtain that e−λA
B
i (0|P,K) = 1
PrBi (1|P,K)
− 1. We can see that the expected probability
to buy at period 2 for trader i is computed as follows: if P < 10K+2, we have
E1(Pr
B
i (2|P,K) = c1PrBi (1|P,K) +
c2
1 + eλ
(
1
PrBi (1|P,K)
− 1
) + c3
1 + e−9λ
(
1
PrBi (1|P,K)
− 1
) ,
(29)
where c1, c2 and c3 are as equation (25).
If P = 10K+2, we have
E1(Pr
B
i (2|10K+2, K) =c4PrBi (1|P,K) +
c5
1 + eλ
(
1
PrBi (1|P,K)
− 1
)
+
c6
1 + e−9λ
(
1
PrBi (1|P,K)
− 1
) + c7
1 + eδλ
(
1
PrBi (1|P,K)
− 1
) , (30)
where c4, c5, c6 and c7 are as equation (27).
Tables 5 and 6 show the values of these probabilities for any price P when the cap on
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Table 5: Price Cap on the first price is 1
Price P qP1 q
P
2 q
P
3 E1(Pr
B
i (2|P,K = 1))
1 1 0 0 1
75
[
44 + 44
4+e−9λ +
36
4+eλ
]
10 0 1 0 11
750
[
32 + 11
11+9e−9λ +
99
11+9eλ
]
100 0 0 1 1
750
[
64 + 11
1+9eλ
+ 99
1+9eδλ
]
Table 6: Price Cap on the first price is 104
Price P qP1 q
P
2 q
P
3 E1(Pr
B
i (2|P,K = 4))
1 1
2
0 0 2381
1.5×108
[
50476 + 2381×9429
2381+119e−9λ +
571×2381
2381+119eλ
]
10 1
4
1
2
0 3143
5∗1011
[
115763301 + 22693750×9429
9429+571e−9λ +
13616250×9429
9429+571eλ
]
102 1
8
1
4
1
2
1
1.92×109
[
997566505 + 360725000
5+3e−9λ +
1258742960
5+3eλ
]
103 1
16
1
8
1
4
1
768000
[
360571 + 16800
1+e−9λ +
30058
1+eλ
]
104 1
16
1
16
1
8
3
3200
[
623 + 12
3+2e−9λ +
73
3+2eλ
]
105 0 1
16
1
16
1
4000
(
797 + 1
1+4e−9λ +
14
1+4eλ
)
106 0 0 1
16
1
4000
[
399 + 1
1+9eλ
+ 9
1+9eδλ
]
the first price are 1 and 104 respectively. Notice that 0 ≤ qP1 + qP2 + qP3 ≤ 1.
• First, let us analyze the case where trader i observes the highest or the second highest
prices.
– Case I: K = 0.
In this case, q1001 = q
100
2 = 0 and q
100
3 = 1. Based on the initial probabilities to
buy and equation (30), we obtain the expected probability to buy at period 2 if
trader i observes price 100 as follows:
E1(Pr
B
i (2|100, 0)) =
1
750
[
64 +
11
1 + 9eλ
+
99
1 + 9eδλ
]
,
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which is strictly lower than 0.1 for λ > 0 and δ ≥ 0. The probability to buy of a
trader who observes the highest price 100 when the price cap is 1 is expected to
decrease immediately between period 1 and period 2.
We look at the second highest price 10. q101 = q
10
3 = 0 and q
10
2 = 1. Given the
initial probabilities and equation (29), similarly we can show that the expected
probability to buy at the second highest price 10
E1(Pr
B
i (2|10, 0)) =
11
750
[
32 +
11
11 + 9e−9λ
+
99
11 + 9eλ
]
,
which is strictly lower than 0.55 (the probability to buy at period 1) when λ > 0
and δ ≥ 0.
– Case II: K = 4.
In this case, q10
6
1 = q
106
2 = 0 and q
106
3 =
1
16
. Given the initial probabilities and
equation (30), we also obtain the expected probability to buy at period 2 is
E1(Pr
B
i (2|106, K)) =
1
4000
[
399 +
1
1 + 9eλ
+
9
1 + 9eδλ
]
,
which is strictly lower than 0.1 for λ > 0 and δ ≥ 0. The probability to buy of a
trader who observes the highest price 106 when the price cap is 104 is expected
to decrease immediately between period 1 and period 2.
We look at the second highest price 105, where q10
5
1 = 0 and q
105
2 = q
105
3 =
1
16
.
Given the initial probabilities and equation (29)), similarly we can show that the
probability to buy at the second highest price 105
E1(Pr
B
i (2|105, K)) =
1
4000
(
797 +
1
1 + 4e−9λ
+
14
1 + 4eλ
)
,
which is strictly lower than 0.2 (the probability to buy at period 1) when λ > 0
and δ ≥ 0.
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– In summary, the probability to buy of a trader who observes the highest or the
second highest price is expected to decrease between period 1 and period 2.
• Second, we analyze the cases where trader i observes prices which are not the highest or
second highest to check whether they will have incentive to speculate more next period,
i.e., period 2. We compute the expected probability to buy at different prices given
different caps by using equation (29). Similarly, we obtain the expected probabilities
to buy in Tables 5 and 6. To this end, we differentiate the expected probability to buy
in these two tables with respect to λ. Computation yields:
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|1, 0))
∂λ
=
1
75
(
396e9λ
(1 + 4e9λ)2
− 36e
λ
(4 + eλ)2
)
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|1, 4))
∂λ
=
283339e−9λ
1.5× 108
(
84861
(2381 + 119e−9λ)2
− 571e
10λ
(2381 + 119eλ)2
)
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|10, 4))
∂λ
=
184328983711341e−9λ
400000000
(
15
(9429 + 571e−9λ)2
− e
10λ
(9429 + 571eλ)2
)
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|102, 4))
∂λ
=
eλ
1.6× 107
(
81163125e8λ
(3 + e9λ)2
− 31468574
(5 + 3eλ)2
)
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|103, 4))
∂λ
=
63e9λ
320(1 + e9λ)2
− 15029e
λ
384000(1 + eλ)2
∂E1(Pr
B
i (2|104, 4))
∂λ
=
3
3200
(
216e9λ
(2 + e9λ)2
− 146e
λ
(3 + 2eλ)2
)
It is easy to show that all the first order differentiations are strictly positive if and only
if 0 ≤ λ < λ∗(P,K), where λ∗(P,K) ∈ (0,+∞). That is, there exists a λ∗(P,K) ∈
(0,+∞) such that the expected probability to buy at price P given cap 10K increases
with λ when λ ≤ λ∗(P,K) and decreases with λ when λ > λ∗(P,K).
When λ = 0, the expected probability to buy at period 2 are equal to 80% when price
is 1 and cap is 1, and 95.24%, 94.29%, 62.50%, 50%, and 60% at prices 1, 10, 102,
103, and 104 and when price cap is 104 respectively, which are exactly the same as
the initial probabilities. When λ → +∞, the expected probability to buy at period
2 are 73.33% when price is 1 and cap is 1, and 95.09%, 87.03%, 55.71%, 49.14%
and 58.78% at prices 1, 10, 102, 103, and 104 and when price cap is 104 respectively.
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These probabilities are all lower than the initial probabilities. Therefore, there exists
a λ′(P,K) ∈ (0,+∞) such that the expected probability to buy at period 2 is greater
than the initial probability if λ ∈ (0, λ′(P,K)) and lower than the initial probability if
λ ∈ (λ′(P,K),+∞).
• In summary, given the initial probabilities to trader from the experimental data, we
find that traders choose not to speculate if the observing price is highest or second
highest. For other lower prices, traders have incentive to speculate especially λ is not
too large.
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